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This study examines the effect of foreign (Anglo-American) board membership on corporate 
performance measured in terms of firm value (Tobin’s Q). On a basis of firms with headquarters in 
Norway or Sweden the study indicates a significantly higher value for firms that have outsider Anglo-
American board member(s), after a variety of firm-specific and corporate governance related factors 
have been controlled for. We argue that this superior performance reflects the fact that these companies 
have successfully broken away from a partly segmented domestic capital market by “importing” an 
Anglo-American corporate governance system. Such an “import” signals a willingness on the part of the 
firm to expose itself to improved corporate governance and enhances its reputation in the financial 
market.   
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The process of globalization affects the equity value of a firm for a multiplicity of reasons. 
One important reason is that it removes barriers to trade and capital flows. Another, which is the 
focus of this paper, is because it reduces firm-level barriers to cross-border information flows and 
corporate governance. This process of globalizing corporate governance systems has recently 
been invigorated by the general abolition of capital controls and better access to a global 
shareholder base (OECD, 1998; Lannoo, 1999; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2000). Historically, 
systematic differences between countries with regard to law and enforcement have accounted for 
substantial variations in financial development and performance (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999).  
The ongoing process of globalizing equity markets and corporate governance systems 
offers firms greater financial flexibility, which in turn provides them the opportunity to cut down 
their cost of capital by reducing cross-border information gaps and agency costs (Karolyi, 1998; 
Useem, 1998; Stulz, 1999; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Randøy, Oxelheim and Stonehill, 2001). 
The removal of barriers to cross-border investment has given firms the alternative of breaking 
away from the corporate governance system of the country in which they have their headquarters. 
Essentially, the firm can opt for one of four corporate governance systems: the Anglo-American 
system, the German system, the Latin system or the Japanese system (see e.g. Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997 and Georgen, 1998).  
Corporate governance concerns the legal, institutional, and cultural mechanisms that help   3
owners and other stakeholders to exercise control over corporate insiders and management (e.g., 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; John and Senbet, 1999; Peace and Osmond, 1999). The Anglo-
American system is commonly regarded as the most demanding corporate governance system. 
The “superiority [ in market performance]  of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance” 
is widely recognized (see e.g. Economist, 2001: 32). The strict information requirements imposed 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) provide further reasons for regarding the 
Anglo-American system in general and the US system in particular as a good proxy for a “global” 
governance model.  
When it comes to handling agency-cost and information problems, the reward for 
switching to the Anglo-American system from a less demanding arrangement appears in the shape 
of a lower cost of capital and a higher firm value (Stulz, 1999). The potential net gains from 
complying with the Anglo-American systems need to be appraised after allowing for the 
substantial costs that compliance itself incurs. These costs arise from such factors as more 
extensive accounting and reporting (e.g. a second annual report in another language - English), 
the need for a broader and more qualified investor-relations staff, and more top management time 
allocated to investors (Howe and Klem, 1987; Useem, 1998; Glaum, 2000).  
This paper analyzes the potential for creating value as a result of breaking away from a 
partly segmented capital market. The generally recognized way of breaking away from a domestic 
capital market is via international cross-listing (e.g., Howe and Madura, 1990; Sundaram and 
Louge, 1996; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999). Here we suggest an alternative approach, 
i.e. signaling compliance with the Anglo-American corporate governance system by including 
representatives of that system on the firm’s board. Using the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system as a proxy for a global system, we emphasize the potential value that can be   4
created by having outsider representatives of that system on the board of non-Anglo-American 
firms. 
 The empirical analysis in this study is based on companies in Norway and Sweden. The 
advantage of breaking away from a segmented or partly segmented capital market is likely to be 
the greatest for (large) companies based in small capital markets (Stulz, 1999). The existence of 
market segmentation or partial segmentation implies that smaller capital markets are not fully 
integrated with the global capital market, usually due to cross-border information asymmetries 
and/or institutional and legal barriers. Whereas the institutional and legal barriers to foreign 
investment have become less of an issue in Scandinavia, cross-border information asymmetries 
are still very much in the picture (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Oxelheim, 2001). Companies 
from partly segmented capital markets such as Norway and Sweden have access to a limited 
domestic shareholder base that makes domestic equity expensive or even unavailable (Oxelheim 
et al. 1998). Consequently we expect an evaluation of companies in Norway and Sweden to show 
a positive effect from breaking out of any of the partially segmented capital markets in these two 
countries. Norway and Sweden demonstrate a set of information and institutional barriers such 
that the result should be applicable to other countries of a similar kind.  
  The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the attributes and implications 
of a global/Anglo-American corporate governance regime and describe corporate routes to 
compliance with that regime. The proposed relationship between Anglo-American board 
membership and firm value is presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides some stylized facts 
about corporate governance in Norway and Sweden.  Section 5 describes the methodology and 
data. The empirical results and their interpretation are presented in Section 6. In Section 7 we 
summarize the key findings and suggest some managerial implications.    5
 
2. Routes to Compliance with a Global Corporate Governance Regime 
 
We suggest that two major approaches are available to non-Anglo-American companies in 
breaking away from a domestic corporate governance model in favor of the more demanding 
Anglo-American corporate governance system: (i) Anglo-American foreign exchange listing, and 
(ii) Anglo-American foreign board membership. The key ingredients of both alternatives are the 
bridging of a cross-border information gap, and an improvement in corporate governance. In both 
cases value can be created through access to new investors. New and/or improved access to a 
foreign investor clientele should entail a higher share price, and thus a lower cost of capital 
(Oxelheim et al. 1998; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000).  
Foreign exchange listing is the most widely recognized way of breaking out of a 
segmented home market with the view to reducing the cost of capital.
1 To our knowledge there 
are no studies with this aim in mind that address the alternative of foreign board membership. A 
foreign exchange listing signals a firm’s commitment to the higher disclosure standards prevailing 
in the market in which it lists. Eventually the signaling will boost foreign investors’ recognition 
of the firm. The potential value-enhancing effect of listing is based on a greater ability to attract 
new investors. For example, Howe and Madura (1990), Sundaram and Louge (1996), Foerster and 
Karolyi (1999), and Miller (1999) analyze the effects of cross-listing and report positive 
cumulative abnornal returns, albeit varying in magnitude. Foreign ownership thus becomes a 
means for achieving a lower cost of capital. The firm can also opt to comply more forcefully by 
simultaneously placing an equity issue on the relevant market. Modén and Oxelheim (1997) and 
Karolyi (1998), analyze the abnormal returns following the announcement of a foreign equity 
issue, and report higher positive abnormal returns than in the case of a listing only.     6
The globalization of ownership creates an opportunity for foreign shareholders to buy 
large stakes in the firm. However, the investors must have confidence that the capital they provide 
will be properly monitored. For small shareholders the cost of getting involved may be 
prohibitive. But larger shareholders can afford active monitoring, for instance through foreign 
board membership (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Board representatives for large foreign 
shareholders are presumably “outsiders” who will not use their influence as board members to 
obtain benefits that do not accrue to other shareholders (see, e.g. Stulz, 1999). As they are more 
likely to perform the arm’s-length monitoring, their entry as owners should increase the value of 
the firm.   
Compliance with the stricter information and monitoring requirements of a more 
demanding corporate governance system can substantially increase a firm’s costs. This also 
discourages managers from extracting private benefits, and it therefore strengthens the firm’s 
commitment to protecting the interests of minority shareholders (Reese and Weisback, 2001). 
Foreign listing – or the undertaking of foreign equity issues - is a costly affair for the firm, both in 
terms of outright expenses and in terms of top management involvement (Oxelheim et. al. 1998; 
Blass and Yafeh, 2001).  
Many small or medium-sized firms might consider such an alternative too costly. For 
these firms, however, there is a way of achieving a global cost of capital at a lower outright cost. 
In exercising this option a firm signals its willingness to improve the monitoring opportunities by 
including foreign outsider members on the board. This alternative of “importing” a more 
demanding corporate governance system by having one or more representatives of that system as 
board members signals a higher commitment to corporate monitoring and transparency. We 
suggest that the presence of at least one foreign outsider member representing a more demanding   7
system, i.e. the Anglo-American system, will result in more active boards that are more 
independent of management. We argue that Anglo-American board membership strengthens 
investor confidence, and this signal will eventually lead to an increase in firm value. The 
underlying assumption is that board members associated with the corporate governance system of 
the country of their citizenship also bring with them the specific features of that system.  
Most past corporate governance studies have presumed implicitly that a company is 
embedded in the corporate governance model of its home country (e.g. La Porta, 1998, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny, 1999), unless the firm is a subsidiary of a foreign company. 
However, an examination of the impact of having an outsider foreign board member reveals three 
different mandate situations. One alternative is that the board member has a mandate to represent 
an owner with a major commercial or long-lasting interest in the firm such as a foreign direct 
investment (FDI) or a subsidiary. A second alternative is that the board member represents a 
foreign owner with a big portfolio stake in the firm. Finally, the board member may be an 
independent outsider chosen by the company specifically to signal its willingness to comply with 
another corporate governance system. The choice is assumed here to be independent of ownership 
structure. By having at least one foreign board member in this third category and representing the 
Anglo-American system, the firm is signaling its willingness to be monitored by the rules of a 
more demanding corporate governance system.  
The strongest consistent signal of commitment is assumed to emerge from a combination 
of a cross-listing on the Anglo-American markets and the inclusion of at least one independently 
chosen outsider foreign board member representing the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system. Both these features indicate an improvement in monitoring and an increase in 
transparency, which we expect to be valued by investors. Hence, the undertaking of an   8
international cross-listing should not, on its own, be regarded as a completed mission.  
 
3. Effects of Anglo-American Board Membership: The Hypotheses 
 
Past research suggests that a firm’s value depends on the quality of the monitoring and 
decision-making undertaken by its board of directors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). A recent survey 
of investors’ opinions around the world reports consistent findings: global investors are willing to 
pay a significant premium (e.g. 18% for Swedish firms) for well-governed corporations 
(McKinsey & Company, 2000).  
In this paper we focus on the alternative of “importing” the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system by including outsider foreign board members. This signal can have both an 
immediate and a long-term effect. The immediate effect, which lends itself to the study of the 
announcement-day effect by applying an event-study methodology, is not addressed here due to 
problems in identifying appropriate announcement days and in dealing with contaminated 
information releases. The first of these difficulties stemmed from the fact that of 225 sample 
firms only two introduced Anglo-American board members during 1996-1998, the period under 
investigation (no companies dropped any such member). Furthermore, almost half the 29 
companies in our sample that had at least one outsider Anglo-American board member in 1998 
and that existed in 1990 had introduced foreign board membership prior to 1990.   
To identify the long-term effect of the inclusion of Anglo-American board members we 
have to control for the effects of any other measures aimed at bridging the information and 
monitoring gaps between the domestic and the Anglo-American corporate governance model.   
As already noted, the immediate effects of such activities undertaken by Nordic firms have been 
found to be substantial. In a study of Swedish firms that undertook foreign listings and equity   9
issues simultaneously (period 1982 to 1993), Modén and Oxelheim (1997) reported a cumulative 
abnormal return of 11% within five days of the announcement day. But there may be long-term 
effects arising from this action as well. An attempt is needed to distinguish the long-term effects 
of foreign listing from the effects arising from the “import” of a foreign corporate governance 
model.  
Corporate governance research recognizes the essential role performed by the board of 
directors in sustaining an effective organization (OECD, 1999; Jensen, 1993). US-based research 
is inconclusive regarding the effect of outside board members. Some studies suggest that outside 
directors can enhance firm performance (e.g., Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990), while others come to 
the opposite conclusion (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). We add a special angle to this 
research by examining the case of outside board members representing a foreign corporate 
governance system, and we claim that in several ways Anglo-American outside board members 
have a particularly important role with respect to monitoring in companies in small or emerging 
economies.  
There is a limited pool of board candidates in a small country, and a conflict of interest 
can easily arise in connection with interlocking board membership. We argue that, by increasing 
the independence of the board, the inclusion of outsider Anglo-American board members should 
reduce managerial entrenchment. For example, the Oslo Stock Exchange had 217 companies 
listed at the end of 1997, with a median of six board members per firm. With most outside 
directors sitting on several boards, many companies may have been experiencing or expecting 
conflicts of interest among their board members. This makes it more difficult to achieve a well-
functioning domestic labor market for board members. In light of the above argument we suggest 
that the inclusion of foreign board members signals that the power of the “old-boy” network is   10
being eroded, which in turn will manifest itself in a growing inclination on the part of the board to 
emphasize truth and frankness in serving their shareholders, rather than giving priority to 
politeness and courtesy among board members (see Jensen, 1993, for an interpretation of such 
boardroom behavior).  
We suggest that the inclusion of a foreign board member is a “step” forward in a firm’s 
globalization process, and the inclusion of an outsider Anglo-American member means crossing a 
first hurdle, namely using English as the official language at board meetings. Further, the new 
member will promote the exchange of information in at least two ways. One is by helping to 
disseminate information to their international network. Since a number of Scandinavian firms are 
the object of substantial foreign investment, the additional influence of an outsider Anglo-
American board member could persuade such a company to act more as though they were located 
in the country of their international investors.  
Secondly, we argue that the presence of outsider Anglo-American board members signals 
a commitment to shareholder rights, something which appeals to investors. It may also signal that 
the firm is less resistant to possible take-overs and less exposed to managerial entrenchment. We 
thus claim that an outsider Anglo-American board member brings the interests of shareholders 
and managers closer together.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between outsider Anglo-American board 
membership and firm value. 
 
 
We suggest that the relative impact of Anglo-American board membership varies under 
different corporate governance conditions (i.e. an out-of-equilibrium position in the terminology   11
of Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). We expect that due to managerial inertia and self-reinforcing 
patterns of organizational learning (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Spender 1996), older firms 
will benefit more from the strict monitoring provided by Anglo-American board membership. 
Past research indicates that younger founder-controlled firms provide a unique form of corporate 
governance monitoring (e.g., Jayaraman, Khorana, Nelling, and Covin, 2000; Mishra, Randøy and 
Jenssen, 2001). We therefore distinguish between younger and older firms and suggest:   
 
Hypothesis 2:  Outsider Anglo-American board membership has a greater impact on firm 
value in older firms than in younger ones. 
 
 
A global shareholder base is especially beneficial to large firms based in small countries, 
since “the risks of equity are shared among more investors with different portfolio exposures and 
hence a different “appetite” for bearing certain risks” (Stulz, 1999: 24). We suggest that when a 
single company represents a large share of the total market capitalization of a national equity 
market, then that firm’s need to build confidence in the global investor community is particularly 
important. Hence, we expect to see outsider international board membership having a greater 
effect on valuation among firms with a high level of market capitalization.  
A firm aspiring to be global needs to spend considerable resources on attracting the 
attention of the global investment community. This effort should be a top priority for the CEO 
(Useem, 1998). The cost structure of this investor-relations activity is largely fixed, and is not 
related to the market capitalization of the firm. It thus represents a barrier for smaller firms. We 
expect that firm size, measured in terms of market capitalization, is related to the impact of 
Anglo-American board membership on firm valuation.   12
 
Hypothesis 3: Anglo-American board membership has a more powerful impact on firm 
value in firms with a high level of market capitalization than in firms with 
a lower level. 
 
 
4. Corporate Governance in Scandinavia
2: Some Stylized Facts 
 
The corporate governance system in Norway and Sweden can be seen as a modified 
version of the German system, with a strong focus on the alignment of interests between 
managers and industrial (corporate) owners (Huse and Eide, 1996). In a review of national culture 
and corporate governance, Peace and Osmond (1999) identify similarities between the 
Scandinavian “civil law” corporate governance system and the system in countries such as the 
Netherlands and Israel. This is also reflected in the legal requirement regarding employee 
representation on company boards in Norway (governing boards and supervisory boards) and in 
Sweden (governing boards). However, all votes in both boards are by simple majority (only 
Norway has two-tiered boards), such that shareholders still hold the ultimate power.
3 
Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1998) argue that investor protection in Norway and Sweden, as one 
important aspect of corporate governance, is equal or almost equal to that in “common law” 
countries such as Ireland or Australia.  
At the end of 1998 foreign investors held about 31% of the total market capitalization of 
the Oslo Stock Exchange, and 33% of the Stockholm Stock Exchange. This high proportion of 
foreign ownership is not new to the two exchanges. It developed gradually beginning in the early 
1980s when the restrictions on foreign ownership of Norwegian and Swedish firms were eased. 
After the beginning of 1995 the use of restricted shares (for domestic owners only) was banned in   13
accordance with the European Economic Area (EEA) treaty (Oxelheim et al. 1998). Since the 
mid-1990s about one-third of the market capitalization on both exchanges has been owned by 
foreign investors (mainly Anglo-Americans).  
 
5. Methodology and Data 
5.1 Data  
The data is based on a random sample of 253 traded companies with their headquarters in 
Norway or Sweden, of which 132 are based in Norway and 121 in Sweden. Companies belonging 
to all industries except finance, banking, and insurance, are included. Nine companies were later 
excluded because they employed unusual reporting periods, eleven were excluded because they 
had been listed for less than three years, and eight companies were omitted because information 
was missing or because their stock was infrequently traded. This left us with data from 225 
Norwegian and Swedish firms. The data set contains 650 firm-year observations in 1996, 1997, 
and 1998, of which 354 refer to Norway and 296 to Sweden. The sample firms cover over half of 
all the exchange-traded firms in Norway and about one-third in Sweden during the sample period.  
The financial variables were collected from annual reports. Information about some of the 
corporate governance variables was also publicly available (e.g., Sundqvist, 1999). Data such as 
the nationality of board members and their mandates were not available from secondary sources. 
Telephone interviews, with fax follow-ups, were used to identify the nationality of board 
members and to verify control variables such as the age of the firm and its foreign industrial 
ownership. Reliable information more closely revealing the mandates of the foreign board 
members was not available, however, since many foreign board members had joined several 
decades ago and no historical documentation of their recruitment remained.    14
5.2 Model specification 
Drawing on previous research on corporate governance, the model for testing the 
hypotheses presented in the preceding section was developed with a variety of independent 
variables to minimize specification bias. We use cross-sectional ordinary least-square (OLS) 
regression and two-stage least-square (2SLS) regression to test the presented model. In our model 
we control for international corporate governance variables (foreign ownership, foreign 
listing/trading, and foreign subsidiary), general corporate governance variables (board size, board 
independence and blockholder ownership), and general control variables that have been identified 
in past studies: firm size (Dalton et al., 1999), industry (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), board 
independence (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991), board size (e.g., Yermack, 1996), and 
blockholder ownership (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  
Past research indicates that the composition of the board may be endogenously determined 
(e.g., Hermalin and Weisback, 2000). For example, a higher firm value could be a result of the 
influence and decisions of past board members (including outside Anglo-American members), 
but could also be a factor influencing potential Anglo-American board members’ interest in 
serving on Scandinavian boards. As recommended by Bhagat and Black (2000), we use a two-
stage least-square (2SLS) model to address the possible problem of endogeneity. In the 2SLS 
model we use foreign listing as an instrument variable to substitute for outsider Anglo-American 
board membership, as foreign listing is highly correlated (0.367) with Anglo-American board 
membership but exhibits a fairly low correlation (0.097) with firm value.  The OLS and 2SLS 
estimated models of the relation between outsider Anglo-American board membership and firm 
value (Q-ratio), and the control variables, are as follows: 
   15
OLS regression model (1): 
Firm value (Q-Ratio) = α 1 + β 1*Anglo-American Board Membership + β 2*Foreign Ownership + 
β 3*Foreign Listing + β 4*Foreign Subsidiary +β 5* Board Size +β 6*Board 
Independence + β 7*Blockholder Ownership + β 8*Firm Size + β 9*Firm Age + 
β 10*Nationality + β i*Industry Dummies                                                              (1) 
 
Instrument variables: First step of 2SLS model (2) 
Anglo-American Board Membership = α a + β a*Firm value + β b*Foreign Ownership + β c*Foreign 
Listing + β d*Foreign Subsidiary +β e*Board Size +β f*Board Independence + 
β g*Blockholder Ownership + β h*Firm Size + β k*Firm Age + β l*Nationality + 
β x*Industry Dummies                                                                                          (2) 
       
 
Explanatory variables: Second step of 2SLS model (3) 
Firm value (Q-Ratio) = α aa + β ab*Anglo-American Board Membership + β ac*Foreign Ownership 
+ β ad*Foreign Subsidiary + β ae*Board Size +β af *Board Independence 
β ag*Blockholder Ownership + β ah*Firm Size + β ai*Firm Age + β aj*Nationality + 
β ax*Industry Dummies                                                                                         (3) 
 
   
5.3. Definition of variables 
The dependent variable firm value is measured by the year-end q-value in 1996, 1997 and 
1998. The q-value is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of total 
assets. To reduce heteroskedasticity, we use the natural logarithm of the q-value as the dependent 
variable. The market value of the firm is measured by the sum of the market value of equity and 
the book value of total liabilities. The applied q-value measure is an approximation of Tobin’s Q 
(Perfect and Wiles, 1994; Chung and Pruitt, 1994), a firm value measure that is widely used (see 
e.g. Morck et al., 1988, McConnell and Servaes 1990, Yermack 1996, McConaughy et al. 1998, 
and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny, 1999). In this approximation of Tobin’s Q, the 
replacement cost of total assets and the market value of total debt are approximated by their book 
values. 
The three kinds of independent variable mentioned previously are all measured on a year-
by-year basis. The explanatory variable outsider Anglo-American board membership in the group   16
of international corporate governance variables is measured as 1, if one (or more than one) 
“outsider” board member is a citizen of either the US, Canada or the UK; 0, otherwise. A director 
is considered an “insider” director when he or she is or has been directly or indirectly employed 
by the firm. We choose not to use the share of outsider Anglo-American board members, since 
the signaling effect of adherence to the Anglo-American corporate governance system would be 
achieved by the inclusion of even one Anglo-American board member.  
In the absence of data on the specific mandate of the foreign board member, foreign 
ownership is used as a proxy for foreign portfolio ownership. It is measured as the share 
(percentage) of equity held by foreign citizens or foreign institutions (all nationalities) in relation 
to the total equity (all share classes) of the firm. We have not been able to break this down by 
home country, which means that we cannot identify the proportion of a firm owned by Anglo-
American investors. However, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) report that in 1997 as much as 
67.2% of all Swedish shares held by foreigners were held by US or UK investors/institutions, and 
at the end of 1998 a similar figure in Norway was 63.4% (Oslo Stock Exchange, 1999).   
We use a dummy variable for firms that are foreign subsidiaries. This is a proxy variable 
to separate the effects of outsider Anglo-American board members representing the owners of 
such companies (the FDI-mandate effect). Companies with a single foreign industrial owner 
holding 20% or more of the firm’s equity (any share class) are classified here as foreign 
subsidiaries. Some studies indicate the need for a higher share of the ownership and unambiguous 
control as a prerequisite for higher returns (see e.g. Chhibber and Majumdar, 1999, in a study of 
Indian firms). However, given the fact that minority ownership rights are relatively strong in 
Scandinavia (La Porta et al., 2000), we expect such effects to appear even at the 20% level. 
A dummy (value 1 for foreign listing, 0, otherwise) is used to identify firms that are listed   17
or traded on one or more Anglo-American foreign exchanges, such as NYSE, NASDAQ, USA 
OTC (ADRs), London Stock Exchange, or SEAQ International   
We use three general corporate governance variables. Board size is the number of 
directors on the board at the end of each sample year. Board independence is the end of year 
percentage of independent outsider directors. We have excluded employee or union 
representatives from the measure of board independence, since employee representation is 
mandatory in larger companies in both Norway and Sweden. Blockholder ownership is the 
percentage of all shares that are owned by the three largest shareholders.  
Among the general control vaiables, firm size is measured by taking the natural logarithm 
of total revenues for each year, as the size alone is not normally distributed. Firm age is measured 
by the logarithm of the number of years between the observation year and the firm’s founding 
year.  We control for industry effects by using six industry groups.  
The legal, cultural and political resemblances between Sweden and Norway suggest that 
corporate governance is also likely to be rather similar. However, there are some differences. 
Norwegian companies, for instance, have, as was previously mentioned, a two-tier board, which 
is not the case in Sweden. To check the magnitude of these differences we use a nationality 
dummy. Separate tests for each country are also reported (Table 6).  
 
6. Empirical Findings 
6.1. Sample characteristics and univariate tests 
Table 1 gives the mean values of the variables used in the study and the F-statistics (two-
tailed) that test the mean differences between firms with and without Anglo-American board 
members. 13% of the firms had one or more Anglo-American board members (84 firm-year   18
observations), a figure that rose from 12% in 1996 to 13% in 1998. The share of Anglo-American 
board members was 10% in Norway and 16% in Sweden. The higher ratio of Anglo-American 
board membership in Sweden reflects the greater average size of Swedish firms on the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange, and the fact that Anglo-American board representation increases with firm size 
(0.254 correlation). Among the world’s 81 largest multinational firms, Gillies and Dickinson 
(1999) find that 36% had at least one foreign board member in 1993. 
The average (unweighted) foreign ownership in the sample is 19%. After adjustment for 
market capitalization, however, the average foreign ownership in our sample is 34% in Norway 
and 38% in Sweden. In this respect the sample is representative, since the corresponding figure 
among all exchange-traded firms in Norway is 31% and in Sweden 33% (Oslo Stock Exchange, 
1999; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001).
4   
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In our univariate analysis in Table 1 we find that firm value, as measured by the ln q-
value, is significantly higher for firms with outsider Anglo-American board membership, which is 
consistent with hypothesis 1. When all industries are considered together, the average ln q-value 
for firms with outsider Anglo-American board membership is 0.61, and the average ln q-value for 
firms without outsider Anglo-American board membership is 0.36. The difference between the 
two groups is significant at a 0.1% level. The q-value for companies with outsider Anglo-
American board membership is 2.78 and for companies without such board membership 1.59.   
Table 1 shows that firms with outsider Anglo-American board members differ in many 
respects relative to firms without such board membership. Firms with Anglo-American board   19
members have a significantly higher level of foreign ownership (39% versus 15%), a greater 
tendency towards foreign listing/trading (44% versus 8%), and a greater likelihood of being a 
foreign subsidiary (23% versus 4%).  They are also  significantly larger and older, as well as 
having more people on their boards. 
On the basis of the industry classifications used by the Oslo and Stockholm Stock 
Exchanges, we group our sample firms into six industry groups. The relatively small number of 
firms that have outsider Anglo-American board members prevent us from breaking these firms 
down into even smaller and more homogenous industry groups. The six groups are (1) property 
and retail, (2) manufacturing, (3) information technology and telecom, (4) media and publishing, 
(5) transportation and shipping, and (6) other industries. The bivariate analysis of the industry 
grouping is shown in Table 1. This shows that firms with outsider Anglo-American board 
members exhibit a significantly higher value (1%-level) than firms without such board 
membership in all industries except retail & property and the shipping & transportation. The 
difference is strongest in information technology & telecom and media & publishing. We use 
dummies for the first five industry groups and “other industries” as our benchmark case in the 
regressions (shown below in Tables 3 and 4). We also run separate regressions for each industry 
group (Table 5). 
The four variables related to international corporate governance are significantly 
correlated with each other (Table 2). However, the correlations between the international 
corporate governance variables are still low enough not to cause multicollinearity problems. The 
highest correlation (0.0382) is between foreign ownership and outsider Anglo-American board 
membership. These not too low and not too high correlations lend support to the basic choice of 
design for this study, as we have argued that the four international governance variables need to   20
be addressed as separate aspects of a firms’ globalization of capital within a multivariate 
framework. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The correlations in Table 2 indicate that both routes to complying with the global 
corporate governance model (cross-listing on Anglo-American markets and outsider Anglo-
American board membership) are significantly and positively correlated with the q-value. As 
predicted in Hypothesis 1, firm value has a positive and significant correlation (1%-level) of 
0.177 with Anglo-American board membership.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
6.2. Multivariate tests 
The regression estimates of our model in Equation 1 appear in Tables 3 and 4. To enhance 
the reliability of our tests, we performed separate tests for each sample-year (Table 3) and a 
pooled regression for all three sample-years (Table 4). The tests in Table 3 show that the value 
effect of outsider Anglo-American board membership is significantly positive for each sample 
year (albeit only at a 10%-level for 1996). As shown in Table 4, the pooled regression model has 
an acceptable explanatory power for a cross-sectional study (adjusted r-squared=37.1%) and all 
the tested models are highly significant (p<0.001).  
 
Insert table 4 about here   21
 
In Table 4 we first conduct a logistic regression to explore further various factors that 
relate to outsider Anglo-American board membership. Our results indicate that foreign board 
membership is significantly related to firm value (positive), foreign ownership (positive), foreign 
listing (positive), foreign subsidiary (positive), board independence (negative), and blockholder 
ownership (positive). To address possible endogeneity in the model design, we then performed 
two-stage least-square tests based on Equations 2 and 3. The 2SLS model produces results 
consistent with the OLS model as regards the effect of outside Anglo-American board 
membership. This suggests that endogeneity effects are not a major problem. Furthermore, the 
2SLS and the OLS results are rather similar in connection with a breakdown by industry (Table 
5), by firm size, firm age, and nationality (Table 7), and so we display the OLS results only in 
Tables 5 and 6. In light of the analyses in Tables 1-4 we suggest that the inclusion of at least one 
outside board member representing the Anglo-American corporate governance system on 
company boards in Norway and Sweden does have a positive valuation effect (Hypothesis 1).  
Table 5 shows that the association between outsider Anglo-American board membership 
and firm value is highly contingent on industry affiliation. We identify outsider Anglo-American 
membership as having the strongest significant effect among manufacturing, information 
technology & telecom firms, and to some extent also among media & publishing firms. A 
possible explanation for the observed effect of this industry affiliation is the relative importance 
of cost of capital in these “high tech” industries, and the fact that they lack the collateral needed 
for debt financing. In contrast, shipping, transportation, property & retailing can rely on 
traditional debt financing. By lowering the cost of capital and increasing its availability the high-
tech firms are able to undertake more R&D, while collateral-based debt financing is still available   22
to the low-tech firms at the same low cost of capital. This is also consistent with the argument 
presented by Carlin and Mayer (1999), namely that bank-based financial systems (the 
Scandinavian case) are less capable than market systems (i.e., the Anglo-American) of providing 
financing for new technology.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Foreign board membership is an essential part of a corporate governance structure that 
determines the firm’s value and the allocation of resources among various stakeholders. Our 
results may be open to the criticism raised by Demsetz (1983) and Cho (1998) that ownership 
structure is an outcome of a selection process that produces a unique firm-specific equilibrium. 
The same theoretical argument could also apply to board effectiveness, including the kind that 
might be generated by outsider Anglo-American board membership. Essentially one could ask: 
are companies successful because they have outsider Anglo-American board members, or could it 
be that these firms attract such board members because they are successful? In other words, it is 
difficult to be certain about the causal direction of the reported associations. A related issue 
concerns the possible endogenous nature of corporate governance variables tested here (including 
foreign board membership), a point raised by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and addressed earlier in 
this paper.  
We have addressed these weaknesses here by grounding the hypotheses solidly in agency 
and financial market theory, and by controlling for a number of factors that could affect outsider 
Anglo-American board membership (such as size, firm age, ownership structure). Specifically, we 
control for the effect of industry and of various corporate governance conditions. Further, we ran   23
the model over a three-year period in which we saw only minor changes in outsider Anglo-
American board membership (Table 3), which suggests that outsider Anglo-American board 
membership is quite stable and does not adjust rapidly to changes in a firm’s profitability or 
market value. This suggests in turn that for the duration of our three-year study period outsider 
Anglo-American board membership is an exogenous variable.  
In line with Hypothesis 2, we find the value of Anglo-American board membership to be 
higher for older firms than for younger ones. However, the difference is only a matter of degree of 
significance: the value-enhancing effect on younger firms is significant, but not as significant as 
in the case of older firms (see Table 6). This is in line with our argument that the inclusion of 
Anglo-American board members is likely to be most beneficial to older firms.   
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
As indicated by Hypothesis 3, the regression results suggest that Anglo-American board 
membership adds more value to firms with a high level of market capitalization (over SEK one 
billion) than to those with a lower level. However, we find a positive value for small firms as 
well, albeit at the 5%-level of significance only. This suggests that the payoff from Anglo-
American board membership is not as closely related to certain fixed cost thresholds as one might 
imagine. This suggests in turn that the organizational costs of Anglo-American board membership 
(e.g., internal reporting in English) may be offset even in the case of smaller firms.   
Finally, the methodological issue of a possible reversed causality - i.e., that a high q-ratio 
could actually cause a higher level of foreign board membership – deserves further attention. 
First, as was shown in Table 4, the 2SLS regression indicates no such reverse causality in the   24
relationship between the q-ratio and outsider Anglo-American board membership. Secondly, the 
corporate governance literature suggests that the boards of well-governed firms penalize 
executives of badly performing firms (e.g., Kaplan, 1995). The t-tests in Table 7 indicate that the 
CEO turnover in our Norwegian and Swedish firms with outside Anglo-American board 
membership is more sensitive to performance, i.e. firms with outside Anglo-American board 
membership are apparently more likely to fire a CEO after a period of poor performance. This is a 
further indication of the causality that we claim does exist and of the validity of the basic 
assumption we have made for the value creating process, i.e. that outsider Anglo-American board 
members provide firms with superior corporate governance. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
7. Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations 
 
Previous studies suggest that a foreign stock listing on an Anglo-American exchange - 
particularly when it is combined with a foreign issue - can increase the value of the firm and thus 
reduce its corporate cost of capital. This study finds that firms in countries whose financial 
markets are only partially integrated can create significant value by “importing” the Anglo-
American governance by including one or more Anglo-American “outsider” members on their 
boards. This provides firms in smaller countries with an alternative way of introducing Anglo-
American corporate governance, and one that should appeal especially to small or medium-sized 
firms.  
This study argues that recruitment of an outsider Anglo-American board member can be 
seen as an alternative avenue to reduce cost of capital that complements the traditional route of   25
seeking foreign listing. We suggest that Anglo-American board membership enhances the 
international orientation of the firm, and serves as a catalyst for further globalization of a 
corporation. Having an Anglo-American citizen on the board is a value statement that signals 
openness to foreign investors and a commitment to corporate transparency, i.e., adherence to the 
Anglo-American corporate governance model.  
We have argued that Anglo-American board membership has a significantly positive 
impact on both small and large exchange-traded firms. This effect appears to be stronger in the 
case of firms that are larger (more than SEK 1 billion in market capitalization) and older (more 
than 30 years old), and  in industries such as manufacturing, IT & telecom, and media & 
publishing. We emphasize that although our overall results suggest that the average firm can 
benefit from Anglo-American board membership, there are certain firm-specific contingencies 
that may reduce the value arising from the inclusion of outsider Anglo-American board members. 
The main recommendation of this paper for corporate policy is that firms based in small or 
emerging equity markets should consider the potential gains of breaking away from their 
domestic corporate governance system, either by including one or more Anglo-American board 
members or by listing on an Anglo-American stock exchange. The long-term value arising from 
the inclusion of an Anglo-American outsider board member seems to exceed that of a cross-
listing on an Anglo-American market. Hence, the inclusion of an outsider Anglo-American board 
member should be seen not only as a low-budget alternative for firms that regard cross-listing as 
too big a venture, but also as an important complement for firms where cross-listing already 
exists.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Firms with Anglo-American Board Membership (AABMs) and 



















International Corporate Governance 
Variables 
         
Anglo-American Board Membership  0.126 0.334  650       
Foreign ownership (%)  18.53  20.25  650  38.67  15.30  114.21*** 
Foreign listing  0.126  0.332  650  0.441  0.076  104.04*** 
Foreign Subsidiary (%)  6.93%  25.42  650  22.62  4.44  40.92*** 
 
General corporate governance 
         
Board size  7.19  2.10  650  8.26  6.98  28.06*** 
Board independence (%)  81.01  23.04  650  76.92  81.31  2.61 
Blockholder ownership (%)  43.94  20.11  650  40.39  44.58  3.24
† 
 
General control variables  
         
Firm size (ln)  6.96  1.87  650  8.08  6.72  40.12*** 
Firm age (ln)  3.64  0.99  225  3.82  3.58  4.24* 
Debt of total assets (%)  57.93  20.21  650  56.44  57.93  0.135 
Asset tangibility (%) 
 
53.37 25.67  650  52.14  53.14  0.12 
Firm Value (log q-value)           
All Industries  0.39  0.53  650  0.61  0.36  20.91*** 
Retail and Property  0.21  0.28  99  0.33  0.20  1.11 
Manufacturing Industry  0.37  0.49  274  0.55  0.34  6.71* 
Information Technology and Telecom  0.96  0.60  86  1.44  0.89  8.89** 
Media and Publishing  0.51  0.48  65  0.93  0.46  6.44* 
Shipping and Transportation Industry  0.15  0.47  126  0.35  0.12  3.47
† 
†p<.10 (two-tailed)  
* p<.05 (two-tailed) 
** p<.01 (two-tailed) 








(1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
1. Q-value (log) 
 
             
2. Anglo-American 
Board Membership 
.177                
3. Foreign ownership 
(%) 
.211 .382            
4. Foreign listing  .097 .367  .378          
5. Foreign Subsidiary  .021 .240  .340 .009         
6. Board size 
 
-.095 .201  .145 .331 .030        
7. Board 
independence 
-.073 -.058  .006  .075  .038  .341       
8. Blockholder 
ownership 
-.207 -.074  -.258 -.227  .050 -.056  .098      
9. Firm size  (log) 
 
-.178 .254  .244 .484 .110 .627 .266  -.022    
10. Firm Age (log) 
 
-.212 .088  .005 .161  -.010 .479 .195  -.011  .449   
11. Nationality 
(Sweden = 1) 
-.087 .101  .038 .063  -.029 .425 .099  -.069  .265  .199 
 Correlations  > 0.101 significant at 1% level (two-tailed).  Correlations  > 0.077 significant at 5% level (two-tailed).  
 33 
Table 3:  OLS Estimates of the Association Between Anglo-American Board Membership, Foreign 
Ownership, Foreign Listing, and Firm Valuation 
 
  Dependent variable: 














































        
General corporate 
governance 
      

























      
























       
# of observations  205  222  223   
Adjusted R-square 
 
0.435 0.361  0.257   
F-Statistics Significance 
 
11.47*** 9.28***  6.09** 
Industry controls are not reported. We use the industry groups shown in Table 4. The pooled regression 
includes two unreported sample-year dummies. Standardized beta values is reported and t-statistics in 
brackets.  
†p<.10 (two-tailed)  
* p<.05 (two-tailed) 
** p<.01 (two-tailed) 
*** p<.001 (two-tailed) 34 
Table 4:  Logistic Regression, OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Association Between Anglo-
American Board Membership and Firm Value (Pooled tests with data from 1996, 1997, and 1998) 
 
Methods:  Logistic 
regression  
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governance 
      



























      






























Yes Yes  Yes   






(Cox & Snell R-square for 
logistic regression) 
 





319.32*** 23.48***  21.20***   
Durbin-Watson 
(Autocorrelation)  
 1.867     
Industry controls are not reported. We use the industry groups shown in Table 4.  The pooled regression 
includes two unreported sample-year dummies. For the OLS and the 2SLS model standardized beta values 
are displayed and t-statistics provided in brackets. For the logistical regression model we show β  values and 
Wald-statistics.  
†p<.10 (two-tailed)  
* p<.05 (two-tailed) 
** p<.01 (two-tailed) 
*** p<.001 (two-tailed) 
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Table 5: The Effect of Anglo-American Board Membership on Firm Value by Industry (OLS pooled 
regression 1996, 1997 & 1998) 
 
  Property & 
Retail 



















































          
General corporate 
governance 
       



































       

































          
# of observations 
(firm-years) 
 
99 274 86  65  126 
# of firm-years with one 
or more Anglo-American 
directors 
6 42 12  7  17 
Adjusted R-square 
 
0.134 0.253 0.261  0.334  0.236 
F-Statistics Significance  2.26* 8.71*** 3.44**  3.67**  4.22*** 
Standardized beta values are displayed and t-statistics provided in brackets. 
†p<.10 (two-tailed)  
* p<.05 (two-tailed) 
** p<.01 (two-tailed) 
*** p<.001 (two-tailed) 36 
Table 6: The Effect of Anglo-American Board Membership, on Firm Value under Various Corporate 
Governance Conditions (OLS pooled regression 1996, 1997 & 1998) 
 
  Market Capitalization  
Subgroups 



















































            












            












            

















            




































            
 
General control variables  
            




































            
 
















0.417 0.430    0.462  0.233    0.394  0.364 
F-Statistics Significance  16.55*** 13.27***    14.38*** 7.82***    15.32***  11.43*** 
Industry controls are not reported. We use the industry groups shown in Table 4.  Standardized beta values are displayed and t-
statistics provided in brackets. 
†p<.10 (two-tailed)  
* p<.05 (two-tailed) 
** p<.01 (two-tailed) 
*** p<.001 (two-tailed) 37 







firms: less than 5% 
ROA (N=328) 
Well performing 
firms: more than 




CEO tenure (years) among firms without 








CEO tenure (years) among firms with 
Anglo-American Board Membership 
4.54 6.21  -1.738* 
* p<.05 (one-tailed) 
                                                 
1 Participation in strategic alliances with companies associated with the more demanding corporate governance systems is a third 
alternative. However, in some respects it is similar to the foreign listing option 
2 This study covers two of the three Scandinavian countries only, since we have not included Denmark. According to the Danish 
Ministry of Finance (1999) Anglo-American board membership among the 50 largest publicly traded firms in Denmark is less than 
2%. Danish law discourages foreign board membership by requiring that the chairman of the board and at least 50% of the board 
be Danish citizens.    
3 In this study we consider the governing board only. 
4 Part of the difference between the sample values and the population can be explained by the fact that we do not include banking, 
finance or insurance, which have slightly lower levels of foreign ownership than other industries.   